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Abstract-The logarithm function, with a slig,ht modification, is proposed to be a general 
utility function for decision making under rusk or uncertainty with knoun probability 
distribution. This utility function, as based on this author’s concept of relative value. 
is mathematically and philosophically justified. It is shown that one normalized utility 
function or curve can be used for different problems, and also for the same problem 
with different degrees of personal preference of risk-aversion. It is also shown that the 
linear case with a straight-line utility function. in which the expected reward (ER) cri- 
terion and the expected loss (EL) criterion can be applied, is a special case of this 
proposed general utility function. A simple example is worked out for illustration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In decision making under risk or uncertainty with known probability distribution, when 
the decision maker has no particular preference, two existing criteria, viz., the expected 
payoff or expected reward (ER) criterion and the expected loss (EL) criterion are equiv- 
alent [I], and the problem of decision making is relatively simple. However, the decision 
maker usually has some preference, dependin g upon his personal interest and circum- 
stances. In that case neither the ER criterion nor the EL criterion can be applied, and it 
is usually necessary to find a particular utility function [2] for the decision maker. The 
utility function as a curve has various shapes, depending upon the individual problem. It 
may be convex upwards, called a risk-averse utility function (the utility function of a risk- 
avoider), it may be concave upwards, called a risk-prone utility function (the utility func- 
tion of a risk-taker), or it may be linear, i.e., the curve is a straight line. The last case is 
relatively simple, as it reduces to that of a decison maker with no particular preference, 
SO that either the ER criterion or the EL criterion may be applied. The concave case, or 
the curve of a risk-taker, is an unusual case. Apart from the normal financial reasons, 
there are usually some other motives or reasons, such as inclination for gambling and 
wishful thinking, behind the preference. Therefore this case will not be discussed in this 
paper and our interest will be centered on the nature of risk-averse utility functions. 
Normally, a utility function is obtained by curve-fitting through actual assessment of 
utilities by the decision maker for various situations of lottery choice. Although practical, 
this method is certainly not neat and ideal. There also exist some mathematical forms of 
utility functions such as CJ( V) = N - e -“‘. However, a function like this exponential 
one also results from curve-fitting, and is essentially a mathematical artifice, because 
there is no theoretical justification for it. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the well-known logarithm function, with a 
slight modification, is a mathematically and philosophically justified general utility func- 
tion, which may be universally applied. In other words, it is the purpose of this paper to 
find a general criterion for decision-making under risk or uncertainty with known prob- 
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ability distribution, such that it will have a large range of application. In fact, it will turn 
out that the ER and EL criteria are special cases of this new general criterion. 
2. JUSTIFICATION 
Recently the nature of utility functions has been greatly clarified through the study of 
risk aversion, as was made by J. W. Pratt [3] and Kenneth J. Arrow [3]. A risk-aversion 
function is defined as follows: 
r(V) = - U”( V)lU’( V) 
where U’(V) is the first derivative of V(V) with respect to V, 
I/“(V) is the second derivative of I/(V) with respect to V 
The philosophical justification for utility functions also has been noticed by Keeney 
and Raiffa, as was pointed out by them that ‘.it seems to be empirically true for many 
people that as their assets increase, they are only willing to pay a smaller risk premium 
for a given risk.” [5] They conclude that decreasing risk-aversion is an important char- 
acteristic of utility functions.* 
The characteristic of decreasing risk-aversion seems to be very natural, reasonable, 
and appropriate. In fact, it conforms to the law of diminishing interest to be presented in 
Section 3. It has been shown that many functions, which used to be regarded as utility 
functions, do not satisfy this property?. 
For instance, for the exponential utility function 
U(V) = 0 - b e-““, 
the risk-aversion function r is the constant c. Therefore this function is not decreasingly 
risk averse. 
For the quadratic utility function 
U(V) = (I + b V - c V’, 
over the specified range of V, the risk-aversion function r increases as V increases. There- 
fore U is not decreasingly risk-averse too. 
For the double exponential utility function 
U(V) = -em“” - be-““, Cl > c, 
the risk-aversion function r approaches n as V goes to negative infinity and approaches 
c as V goes to infinity. Thus for c < N, this function is decreasingly risk averse. However, 
it still seems to be not a proper one because r approaches a constant c as V goes to infinity. 
As a refinement of the concept of decreasing risk-aversion, there has been developed 
another concept called “proportional risk aversion”, denoted by V r(V)S. The mathe- 
matical details of the derivation of proportional risk aversion are beyond the scope of this 
* Keeney and Raiffa [5] put it this way: “As we will soon see, many of the ‘traditional’ candidates for a 
utility function. such as the e,xponential and quadratic utility functions, are not appropriate for a decreasing risk- 
averse decision maker. Thus the characteristic of decreasingly risk-aversion places strong restrictions on the 
shape (i.e., functional form) of one’s utility function.” 
+ See Ref. 5. pp. 162, 168. 172. and Ref. 3. 
$ See Ref. 5. p. 178. 
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paper and will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that it has been shown that only a 
few classes of function have a constant proportional risk aversion, i.e.. with V r( I’) = 
c:. 
These functions are: 
1 
v fort = 0 
U(I’) - ,“oQ; 
fore< 1, c#O 
fort= I 
- V-(c-” for c > 1 
Out of these four classes of functions, the logarithmic function is the most appropriate 
one, because it conforms to human nature [6],*” and therefore is philosophically justified. 
The philosophical justification for it is based on the law of diminishing interest and the 
concept of relative value, which will be discussed in the following. Ovving to its flexibility 
in curvature through the adjustment of capital C, and hence its general applicability, the 
logarithm utility function will be called a “general utility function.” 
3. VALUE AND RELATIVE VALUE 
Now the general utility function will be developed from the theory of value of this 
author. Since these definitions are quoted in this paper, no further explanation seems to 
be necessary. Value is defined as follows. 
An object 0 is said to have a value V for a subject S if and only if 0 has one or more 
special characters which make S prefer possessing, using, experiencing and/or enjoying 
0 to not possessing, not using, not experiencing and/or not enjoying 0. S is said to take 
an interest in 0 if and only if 0 has a value for S. 
Similar to the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility in economics, a Law of Diminishing 
interest was established by this author [6, 71 as follows: 
“Let V be the value of an object 0 for a subject S, and I be the interest of 5. A 
geometrical increase in V will, on the average, produce an arithmetic increase in I.” 
The term relative value has several different senses [8]*. Since these senses are not 
universally accepted nor clearcut, they will not be adopted here, and relative value is 
redefined mathematically as follows. 
K=InE (3.1) 
$ See Ref. 5, pp. 175-177, Ref. 3. and Ref. 4. 
** In Sheng [6]. which is at present not publicly available, this author has developed a theory of value. as 
a part of an ethical theory, where value and relative value are specifically defined, a law of diminishing interests 
is established, and a theorem justifying the representation of degree of interest by relative value is proved. It 
is also extensively discussed that the main basis for the law of diminishing interest is human sensitivity. Here 
suffice it to say that human sensitivity with respect to the change of a certain quantity man perceives. such as 
length. weight and intensity of sound, is approximately inversely proportional to the quantity, and that human 
interest is a kind of sensitivity. 
* An excerpt is taken from Fishburn [S] as follows: “In considering the relative value of a consequence to 
the decision maker. ‘relative value’ is used in several different senses. First. it means that the value of a particular 
consequence c, is relative to the set of consequences Q. Second, it means that the value or worth of a consequence 
is relative to the decision maker in his environment. Third, the value of a consequence is relative to the set of 
objectives 0 held by the decision maker. Finally. in its more common usage, 
to ‘nbsolute’ 
relative value’ is used as opposed 
L , in the sense that absolute value is taken to mean intrinsic worth or that there is some natural 
definition of zero value. No object. concept. or consequence has value of and by itself. but taken on (relative) 
value only through a human agent with a purpose. The aspects of ‘relative’ considered above are, of course. 
not independent of one another but are invariably interwinde. The important point we wish to stress is that 
relative value refers to the importance that the decision maker, motivated bv a set of objectives 8, attaches to 
members of a set of consequences considered by him in a specific decision situation.” 
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where \’ is the value of an object for a subject S. 
Vh is a base value for S. which may be arbitrarily chosen. 
R is the relative value of object 0 for subject 5. with respect to base value Vh. 
A theorem justifying this definition of relative value vvas established [6. 71. vvhich will 
be quoted here without proof: 
“If the law of diminishing interest holds, then the relative value R for a subject S with 
respect to any base value lib will represent the degree of interest of S.” 
Here natural logarithm is used for the definition of relative value. However, it is in 
fact immaterial what base is used for the logarithm. because the difference is only a 
constant factor. If the user of the utility function finds that in computation it is more 
convenient to use 10 as the base of logarithm then In in (3.1) may be replaced by log,,. 
(3.1) will be used in the following for the derivation of the utility function. 
1. CAPITAL, BASE VALUE, AND UTILITY FUNCTION 
Since risk-prone utility functions are, as mentioned above, exceptional rather than 
normal. they will not be considered here. Practically most decision-makers have risk- 
averse utility functions with curves convex upwards. This is essentially due to financial 
reasons. Suppose a risky investment has a much higher expected reward than a conser- 
vative investment, but with a slight chance of having a big negative reward, i.e., the 
decision maker has a small probability of suffering a big loss. If the decision-maker does 
not have enough money to pay the loss in case this state of affairs happens so that he 
may have to be bankrupt, then he will naturally give up this risky investment, in spite of 
its higher expected return. 
To take this kind of situation into full account, a quantity C, called “capital”, is in- 
troduced. By capital is meant the maximum amount of money that a decision maker is 
able or willing to invest or to have involved in the action for which a decision is to be 
made. Note that this capital is a theoretical quantity, and is not necessarily the actual 
capital the decision-maker has. It also depends on the personal preference of the decision- 
maker. As will be seen later, the magnitude of capital C affects the shape or convexity 
of the curve of the utility function. The smaller the magnitude of C is, the more convex 
the curve will be. Therefore a more conservative or risk-avoiding person corresponds to 
a smaller magnitude of capital, and a less conservative or risk-avoiding person corresponds 
to a larger magnitude of capital. Thus instead of using practical tests of lottery choice to 
determine the preferences and hence the utility function of the decision-maker, personal 
preferences and actual financial conditions are both taken care of by the adjustment of 
the magnitude of capital C. 
Usually the decision-maker has some money prepared for the worst case, i.e.. the least 
preferable situation. In other words, the money prepared is usually at least sufficient to 
pay the minimum payoff, if it is negative. For a big corporation, capital may be the actual 
capital of the corporation. For a personal investment, capital may be the total amount of 
money the decision maker puts aside for this investment, or may be his total assets, 
including any loan which he is able to raise and has the potentiality of paying off, depending 
upon the decision-maker’s personal preference. C has to be determined by tests too, but 
once it is determined, the resulting curve is more smooth and consistent than that deter- 
mined by lottery choices completely. 
The various quantities will be defined formally in Section 5. Here some of them will 
be used without being defined rigorously. Consider the discrete case. Let G (cl;, t3i) be 
the payoff or reward of an action cl; in a certain state of affairs 0j. A constant C called 
capital is added to every G (ai, 9j) to form a quantity V (CJ;, 8j) called total value. That 
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is. 
C’ (nj, 8,) = G (ni. 0,) f C (4.1) 
This simply means that if the state of affairs is 61, and if the decision-maker takes an 
action n;, then he will have a total value of c’ ((I;, 0,), which includes what he already, 
has as capital C and what he will probably make out of the decision as reward G (0;. 0,). 
Next the relative value R ((I,, 8,) corresponding to V (ai, Bj) will be determined. i.e.. 
R (n;, 0,) = In 
V (Cli, ej) 
Vh 
= In V (ni, ej) - In Vh 
where Vh is an arbitrary base called base value. 
Note that Vh may be any value. or may be not used at all (not using VI, is equivalent 
to setting Vh = I), because the introduction of Vh simply subtracts a constant term from 
each In V (ai, Oil. However, for the sake of convenience and normalization, Vh may be 
set to be equal to V,,,, the least total value for all states of affairs and all possible actions. 
Let R,i, be the relative value for V,i,. Then we have 
V 
R,i” = In I’, = In 
vmin 
- = In I = 0 
vmin 
(4.3) 
Now, R = In ( V/Vh) as a function of V is taken as the utility function. When plotted 
as a curve, it is a curve of risk-avoiders, which is universally applicable to any case. It 
passes through the horizontal or V-axis at V = V,,. A formal presentation will be given 
in the next section. 
5. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
Let 
A = {[Ii}, i = I, . . . , II be the set of II discrete actions. 
s = {e,),j = I, . . , m be the set of t>z states of affairs for the discrete case. 
S = {t3} for the continuous case, where 0 is a continuous variable having an infinite number 
of values. 
P (e,), j = 1, . . . , IH be the probability distribution of 0, for the discrete case. 
P (0) be the probability density of 8 for the continuous case. 
G (Ui, ej), i = 1, . . , II, j = I, . ) m be the payoff or reward for the action cli and 
the state of affairs Bj for the discrete case. 
G (a;, e), i = 1, . . . , n be the payoff or reward for the action cli and the state of affairs 
13 for the continuous case. 
C be the capital, a constant. 
V (n;, I3i) = R (a;, t3,) + C, i = 1, . . , n, j = I, . , tn be the total value for the action 
ni and the state of affairs 0, for the discrete case. 
vh, e) = R (ai, e) + c, i = I, . . , 12 be the total value for the action cl; and the state 
of affairs 0 for the continuous case. 
VJ, be a base value, which may be arbitrarily assigned. To normalize the utility function 
curve, Vh may be assigned the value V”,i”, the minimum or least preferable total 
value. 
R (n;, f3,) = In (V (aj, Oj)/Vh), i = 1, . . , n, j = I, . . , m be the relative value for 
the action ni and the state of affairs Bj for the discrete case. 
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U (a,. 0,). i = I. . , n. j = 1, . . , nt be the utility for the action ~1, and the state of 
affairs 0;, for the discrete case. 
I/ (a,. 0). i = 1, . . , n be the utility for the action ill and the state of affairs 0 for the 
continuous case. 
EU (a;), i = 1, . . , n be the expected utility for the action No. 
Then, for the discrete case. we have 
I/ (a,. Oj) = R (a;, f3j) = In 
v (Cl,, Bj) 
v . 
h 
and for the continuous case 
U ((l;, 0) = R (a,, 0) = In 




Since U (a,. 8j) and U (ni, 0) can be calculated using (5.1) and (S.?), it is, in fact, no 
longer necessary to plot the curve of the utility function. 
NOW EU (ai). the expected utility for an action, can be calculated as the weighted 
average of U (a;, 0j) or U (n;, 0) over the probability distribution or probability density, 
as is usually done, as follows: 
For the discrete case, we have 
,,I nr 
EU (ai) = x U (ai, Oj) P (Oj) = C R (ai, 0j) P (0j) 
j= I j= I 
,,, 
= 2 p (ej) In ’ “I;, "I
j= I 
For the continuous case, we have 
EU (0;) = 1 U (a;, 0) p (8) d0 = 1 R (ai, 0) P (0) n0 
= I P (0) In v (% *) tie 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
where the integration is over the set S. 
6. EXAMPLE 
Let us consider a simple discrete example of a chemical manufacturer to make a de- 
cision out of two possible alternatives. a, is an action to manufacture a new chemical 
product, the cost of which is very much dependent upon the price of petroleum. If there 
is no further increase in petroleum price in the coming year, the profit is relatively high. 
But if there is a further increase in petroleum price, then there will be a loss instead of 
a profit. CI? is an action to manufacture the old product, the cost of which is less dependent 
upon the price of petroleum. Let 0, be the state of affairs that there is no increase in 
petroleum price, with a probability P (0,) = 0.60, and (!I? be the state of affairs that there 
is an increase of petroleum price, with a probability P (6,) = 0.40. 
The payoff table is shown in Table 1. First let us assume that C = $2,000,000. The 
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total valce table is shown in Table 2. The V/Vh table is shown in Table 3. The relative 
value (R) table is shown in Table 3. The curve R vs. V,, or the utility function is plotted 
in Fig. I. 
Table I. Payoff table. 
01 Hz 
Ss00.000 - 5200.000 
5300.000 S200.000 
Table 2. Total value table (C = SZ.OOO.000) 
01 01 
fll %2.800.000 S I .800.000 
(12 52.300.000 $2 zoo 000 . . 












Fig. I. Utility function curve (C = SZ.OOO.000). 
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The expected utilities for U, and 112 are calculated as follovvs: 
EG(II,) = I:(([,. 0,) P(O,) -7 L’(o,. 02) P(H:) 
= 0.112. x 0.6 T 0 x 0.4 = 0.265 
EU(a2) = Ii (1/z. 0,) P(0,) + u (Cl?. 03) P(H:) 
= 0.215 x 0.6 + 0.300 x 0.4 = 0.227 
Since EU ((1 I1 > EC/ ((I--). the decision will be to take action (I,. 
Next assume that C = $500.000. The total value table is shown in Table 5. The C’iVh 
table is shown in Table 6. The relative value (R) table is shown in Table 7. 
The curve R vs. V/V,, or the utility function is the same as that shown in Fig. 1. but 
a longer portion of the curve is used now. Figure I is reproduced in Fig. 2. 
Table 6. Vi V,, table I C = S500.000) 
01 0: 
(1 I 4.333 I ,000 
0 2 2.667 2.333 
Table 7. Relative value (R) table (C = 5500.000) 
01 02 
(1 t I .466 0.000 
0 2 0.981 0.847 
Fig. 2. Utility function curve (C = S500.000~. 
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’ The expected utilities for (zI and cl2 are calculated as follo~~s. 
EL/ (a,) = I/ (a,. 8,) P (8,) - u (Cl,. Hz) P (81) 
= 1.1666 x 0.6 + 0 x 0.4 = 0.880 
EU ((12) = I/ (oz. 8,) P (8,) - U (nz. 81) P (e2) 
= 0.981 x 0.6 c 0.817 x 0.4 = 0.928 
It is seen that although El/ (a,) > EU (u2) when C = S1.000.000. now Eli ((12) > EU 
(n ,) when C = S500.000. Thus in this case the decision Lvill be to take action (12. 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
K. J. Arrow pointed out that the logarithm function is an appropriate constant-relative 
risk-averse function, and that it may be regarded as an approsimation to a bounded utility 
function [4].+ In fact it can be shown that the other two types of functions of constant 
proportional risk aversion, viz., U(V) = VI-‘for<.< I and U(V) = -V”-“for(.> 
1, each can be approximated by a logarithm function for a finite portion not starting from 
V = 0. In this sense it seems justified that the logarithm utility function is considered a 
general one. 
Arrow further pointed out the boundedness of a utility function at both the higher and 
the lower end.8 The function ol( V) = !I-' for L’ < 1 is bounded at the lower end. but 
not at the higher end, the function U(V) = - V-” - I’ for c > 1 is bounded at the higher 
end, but not at the lower end, and the logarithm function is not bounded at both ends. 
Arrow [4] suggested that the logarithm function. for which c = I, is a good compromise. 
because by making c slightly greater than one at the higher end and slightly less than one 
at the lower end the function would be bounded at both ends. 
This boundedness may seem neat from the mathematical point of view. but is not 
necessarily justified philosophically. In problems of investment, where the least total value 
and the greatest total value are given or known, the utility function is actually bounded 
at the higher end because the value V is never infinite. and is set to be bounded at the 
lower end because U is usually set to 0 when V is 0. If a constant-proportional risk-averse 
function is used as a utility function, in order to obtain the required curvature, usually 
only a certain segment of the curve. obtained through linear transformation and normal- 
ization, is used. In that case the curve can be arbitrarily assigned values for U at both 
ends. Note that even if U = V’-’ is used, with U = 0 for V = 0, the initial segment 
starting from U = 0 is still unsuitable for utility function. because the first derivative U' 
is infinite at V = 0. 
In problems of incremental interest with respect to total property. distribution of wealth, 
f A part of Arrou's [-I] euposition: ” if. for simplicity. ive \\ish to assume a constant relative risk aversion. 
then the appropriate value is one. As can easily be seen, this implies that the utility ofwealth equals its logarithm. 
a relation already suggested by Bernoulli. To be sure. the logarithm is not bounded at either end. but it may 
still be regarded as an approsimation to a bounded utilitv function. for if the relative risk aversion were ever 
so slightly greater than one at the higher end of the wsal;h scale and ever so slightly less at the louver end. the 
utility function would be bounded at both ends and yet essentially logarithmic throughout the greater part of 
the range” [p. 981. 
4 A paragraph of Arrow [3] is quoted: “The important point is that the variation of the relative risk aversion 
with changing wealth is intimately connected with the boundedness of the utility function. It can be shown as 
a mathematical proposition that if the utility function is to remain bounded as v,ealth becomes infinite. then the 
relative risk aversion cannot tend to a limit below one: similarly. for the utility function to be bounded (from 
below) as wealth approaches zero. the relative risk aversion cannot approach a limit above one as wealth tends 
to zero” [p. 971. 
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and social welfare functions, however, boundedness at both ends is philosophic>lly un: 
justified. The situation that there is absolutely zero value for a person is inconceivable. 
for when one has no saving and no property at all. one still has to live on. and has the 
potential of some sort of income to support one’s future living. Since utility is a relative 
measure, it is more reasonable to assume the situation V = V’h to be a neutral or reference 
situation with zero utility. Therefore when V < c’, the utility becomes negative. Thus 
philosophically there is no reason to set the minimum utility to be zero for V = 0. At the 
higher end. when V increases to infinity, according to the law of diminishing interest. I/ 
also increases to infinity, although at a much slower rate. Therefore philosophically the 
boundedness of utility function at the higher end is also unjustified. It is thus seen that 
in these problems U(V) = V' -’ and U(V) = - VP-('- -I’ are both inadequate to serve as 
a utility function, and CJ( V) = In V or In (V/V,,) is a very rational, general, proportional 
risk-averse utility function. 
From the above analysis the features of the logarithm utility function can be brought 
out. and some conclusions made, as follows. 
I. If the minimum total value is chosen as the base value, then the relative value of 
the utility function is normalized in the sense that the portion of the curve used for each 
problem starts from R = 0, i.e., where the curve intersects the V axis. 
2. The value of capital C chosen for a certain problem does not have to be the exact 
actual value of capital. The subjective preference of the decision-maker can be taken into 
account by adjustment of C. If the decision-maker is conservative, C may be chosen 
smaller, and if the decision-maker is aggressive, then C may be chosen larger. 
3. For the same problem, the larger the value C is, the shorter and the less curved the 
used portion of the curve will be. The smaller the value C is, the longer and the more 
curved the used portion of the curve will be. 
4. If the value of C is very large, as in the case of a big corporation or of a wealthy 
person, then the used portion of the utility function curve will be very short. and will 
look like a straight line. not in the sense that the equation of the curve approaches that 
of a straight line, but in the sense that a very small segment of any curve after magnification 
looks like a straight line. In that case, the ER or the EL criterion may be applied. Thus 
these two criteria can be considered a special case of this general utility function, when 
C approaches infinity. 
5. The same curve R vs. V is applicable to almost all problems, although it does not 
necessarily fit the lottery choice of preference of every individual. For different problems. 
and even for the same problem with different values of capital C, different segments of 
the curve may be used. 
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